ECHO Threat Assessment: Great Power Competition in the Arctic Region 2025
Author’s Note:
In recent months, U.S. President Trump and his administration's intention to "buy Greenland" has surprised the American public, the people of Greenland, the Danish population, our allies, and certainly caught the attention of America's adversaries. Why such a strong focus on Greenland? Why the desire to purchase it? Is this just another example of the boorish diplomacy we have come to expect, or is there something more significant at play?
This threat assessment from ECHO does not aim to promote a specific approach to diplomacy or suggest particular methods of statecraft for the administration. Instead, it seeks to address the critical question of why the Arctic matters. What opportunities, challenges, dangers, and uncertainties exist in this rapidly evolving and often overlooked region of the world? Moreover, why will the Arctic become a silent battleground for great power competition over the next decade?
- Bishop
Executive Summary
ECHO evaluates the Arctic region as a critical flashpoint of great power competition among the U.S., China, and Russia over the next decade. This competition will be marked by increasing geopolitical tensions and military and economic developments crucial for each nation's domestic and foreign policy strategies.
ECHO summarizes the Arctic's importance through three strategic components: (i) access to essential natural resources, such as fossil fuels and rare earth elements; (ii) access to alternative commercial shipping routes between major international markets; and (iii) the geographic capability to deploy critical national defense assets, including early warning and nuclear launch detection facilities.
ECHO Intelligence's key findings regarding great power competition in the Arctic region include:
Strains between the U.S. and its key allies, including NATO and NORAD, will limit America's regional influence. Ongoing tensions could reduce military cooperation and weaken the U.S. presence abroad, undermining Arctic collaboration essential for maintaining diplomatic channels during heightened crises.
Facing constraints in military personnel, workforce, and economic stability due to the ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia is likely to welcome foreign investment for joint ventures in the Arctic. Foreign investment and coventures will likely include oil and gas exploitation and the development of critical infrastructure to establish the Northern Sea Route as a viable international shipping lane.
Viewing U.S. actions regarding the Panama Canal as a hostile challenge to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) Belt and Road Initiative, China will likely continue to invest in cooperative ventures in Arctic fossil fuel development and the Northern Sea Route. Further, China will likely leverage ongoing tensions between the U.S. and its Arctic allies (NORAD, NATO) to strengthen its foothold in the region. The PRC or Chinese firms will financially back key infrastructure projects such as airports and search and rescue facilities and engage in fossil fuel and rare earth element mining and scientific expeditions.
ECHO recognizes that, as highlighted below, the primary factors and key drivers reshaping the threat landscape of the Arctic have little direct relation to the region itself. ECHO makes the assessments above under the key assumptions that (i) Denmark and Greenland will persist in resisting the U.S. President Trump's expressed desire to acquire Greenland; (ii) that China will refrain from direct military action toward their desired 'reunification' with Taiwan back into the mainland; (iii) U.S. will continue to force development of economic influence and control over the Panama canal through various U.S. businesses; (iv) Russia will persist in prolonging their war with Ukraine; and (v) key strategic alliances and allies for the U.S. in NATO and NORAD will become increasingly strained during U.S. President Trump's second term, further isolating American influence. Deviations from any of the five key assumptions noted above expose the risk of significant deviations in ECHO's confidence levels in this assessment. Deviation from these assumptions or the emergence of a Black Swan event would significantly impact ECHO Intelligence's confidence in the likelihood of these assessments.
Strategic Context
On March 18, 2025, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. This annual assessment, which addresses the requirements outlined in Section 617 of the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act (Pub. L. No. 116-260), provides policymakers and the American public with a concise summary of the key national security threats facing the U.S. as evaluated by experts within the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC). The assessment emphasizes the Arctic region approximately twelve times, particularly concerning America's "great power competitors," China and Russia.
The Arctic region covers about 5.5 million square miles, including the Arctic Ocean and surrounding land masses, with the Arctic Circle located 66.5° north of the Equator. There are eight sovereign Arctic states: the U.S. (through Alaska), Russia, Canada, Iceland, Denmark (via Greenland), Norway, Sweden, and Finland. This assessment highlights governance and cooperation among the states of the Arctic region through organizations like NATO, NORAD, the Arctic 5, and the Polar Silk Road.
Figure 1 - Visualization of Interdependent Arctic Governance Structures
Currently, the Arctic has three major commercial shipping routes: the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the Northeast Passage, and the Northwest Passage. Historically, heavy sea ice has restricted the viability of all three routes as alternatives to traditional sea shipping lanes. However, due to ongoing climate change, Arctic sea ice has steadily reduced in extent, area, and thickness, allowing free-floating ice to become increasingly mobile and widely distributed. The decline in ice and the increased mobility have significantly enhanced the potential for Arctic sea routes, particularly the NSR, to emerge as critical strategic shipping lanes in global commerce.
Figure 2 - Source: The Arctic Gateway; National Snow and Ice Data Center, University of Colorado Boulder.
The receding ice levels and improving accessibility in the Arctic region open up opportunities for greater exploitation of natural resources. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, 13%—or 90 billion barrels—of the world's untapped and undiscovered conventional oil resources are in the Arctic region. Additionally, the Arctic is rich in unexploited mineral resources, including platinum, apatite, tungsten, zinc, lead, chromite, palladium, and diamonds. In particular, climate change has accelerated the melting of Greenland's ice sheet, revealing extensive coastal lands available for mining gold, platinum, copper, nickel, iron, zinc, diamonds, and rubies. These newly accessible coastal areas in Greenland contain large deposits of rare earth elements (REEs) such as cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, and yttrium, which are critical for producing and developing next-generation technologies with both civilian and military applications.
Historically, U.S. Arctic policy has focused on four main priorities: (i) defending U.S. Arctic territory (Alaska); (ii) enforcing freedom of navigation and international law; (iii) ensuring U.S. energy security and access to vital resources; and (iv) protecting the environment and indigenous populations. However, recent changes in the Arctic region necessitate a reevaluation of this overarching strategy.
The increasing mobility and capability of utilizing Arctic sea routes as alternative shipping lanes to connect key global markets, along with the greater accessibility of untapped fossil fuels, essential mineral resources, and rare earth elements (REEs), critical for next-generation technology production, are all contributing to heightened tensions over control and influence in the region.
U.S. policy and posturing in the Arctic have been significant. In 2022, the U.S. published its National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR), which defined U.S. Arctic Policy goals to include (i) enhancing domain awareness, deterring adversarial aggression, and safeguarding freedom of navigation; (ii) addressing climate threats and promotion of environmental stewardship; (iii) investment in Arctic infrastructure and building resilience for Arctic communities; and (iv) strengthening established multilateral forums and Arctic governance efforts. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD) 2024 Arctic Strategy centers upon bolstering U.S. military capabilities in Arctic conditions, strengthening cooperation with A7 nations, and expanding existing joint Arctic military exercises and operations supporting freedom of navigation in the region.
Currently, the Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, the Clear Space Force Station in Nenana, and the Eilson Air Force Base and Fort Wainwright in Fairbanks represent official U.S. military presence in the Arctic. Additionally, the U.S. maintains a presence at the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), operated by the U.S. Space Force, NORAD, and the Space Operations Command to detect ICBM launches, monitor satellites, and support global missile defense operations. Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard's Arctic detachments of icebreakers and forward-deployed helicopters and cutters and the U.S. Navy's non-permanent Arctic operations are current demonstrations of American Arctic hard power.
Threat Landscape
Following the Cold War, Arctic states have worked to uphold the region as one characterized by cooperation, low tensions, and the peaceful resolution of disputes grounded in mutual respect for international law. However, this status quo is now facing pressures from contemporary geopolitics, particularly with the rise of three major powers— the U.S., Russia, and China—each vying for influence in the region to support a new global order centered around their defense, economies, and strategic interests. To fully understand the threat landscape in the Arctic, it is essential to identify the key factors driving competition among these nations. The competitive interests of Beijing and Moscow are not a zero-sum game and should not be viewed as mutually exclusive.
Adversarial Posturing and Competitive Interests
Russia
With 20% of its landmass and multiple population centers located above the Arctic Circle, Russia is the most prominent Arctic state in terms of total area, coastline, population, and untapped resources. The importance of the Arctic region to Russian exports and its economy is significant. From 2019 to 2020, 80% of Russia's natural gas production and 17% of its oil exploitation occurred in the Arctic. In addition to resource extraction, the Kremlin has focused on investing in constructing Arctic ports and dual-purpose (civilian and military) search-and-rescue facilities.
Outwardly facing Arctic policy from the Kremlin focuses defines six primary Russian interests in the region: (i) ensurance of the sovereignty of the Russian Federation; (ii) preservation of the Arctic as a peaceful territory with mutual beneficiaries; (iii) safeguarding the quality of life and wellbeing of the Russian population in the region; (iv) development of the region as a strategic resource base to accelerate the economic growth of the Russian Federation; (v) progression of the NSR as a national transport competitive to conventional global commerce shipping routes; and (vi) environmental and Indigenous peoples protection.
ECHO Assessment: Constrained by overexerting military and economic resources to sustain its war campaign, the Kremlin is likely to welcome foreign partnership and investment in strategic joint ventures in the Arctic region, which would support the renewal of the Russian economy and strength.
Some reports suggest that the Kremlin has begun modernizing its Soviet-era Arctic bases. However, since the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia has significantly reduced its military personnel and essential equipment in the region. Additionally, Russia has been excluded from joint cooperative Arctic initiatives involving the U.S., Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland—collectively known as A7. As a result, Russia has been compelled to seek alternative partners, as noted in the China subsection below.
In direct response to the invasion of Ukraine, Finland, and Sweden have joined NATO, transforming the 833-mile border between Russia and Finland into a Russia-NATO border. This change has heightened Russia's and NATO's interest in and responsibility for enhancing regional security. In December 2022, Russia indicated its intent to bolster its military presence closer to the Nordic states.
In March 2025, Russian President Putin showed the Kremlin's contemporary Arctic Posture. Putin, noting U.S. President Trump's expressed intentions toward 'acquiring' Greenland to be 'serious,' dismissed the rhetoric regarding Greenland having much relation towards the Russian Federation. Instead, he deflected to lay blame on NATO, expressing that the alliance "in general [is] increasingly designating the far north as a springboard for possible conflicts, practicing the use of troops in [Arctic] conditions, including by their 'new recruits'..." –referring to Finland and Sweden. Putin further signaled Russia's importance in expanding northern ports and Russian fleet activity in the Arctic, including nuclear next-generation icebreakers. However, Putin expressed that domestic production capabilities to meet these needs are currently limited, likely due to ongoing expenditures in Ukraine.
Also in March, President Putin confirmed Russian interest in increasing commercial commerce through the NSR to be critical to the Kremlin's goals of shifting trade priorities from the West to Asian nations. Thus far, this desire for cooperative venture and foreign investment in Russian Arctic efforts has only come from the PRC. In this vein, Reuters reports that oil shipments from Russian ports to China via the NSR increased by 25% in 2024. Putin has further welcomed foreign investment in Russian projects in the Arctic, with China as a recent strategic partner in development.
China
ECHO concedes that China's northernmost territory, located northeast of Mongolia, stands approximately at the same latitude as the Aleutian Islands in Alaska. The United States uses this geographic reference to define the Arctic for U.S. law. However, China does not consider itself a conventional Arctic state. Instead, in 2018, the People's Republic of China (PRC) identified itself as a "near-Arctic state," classifying itself among the continental states closest to the Arctic Circle.
The PRC supports its claim to near-Arctic status with the following arguments: (i) Arctic conditions have a direct impact on China's climate, ecological environment, and economic interests; (ii) the situation in the Arctic has evolved beyond the original inter-Arctic states and now holds critical importance for the survival, development, and future of humanity; and (iii) as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China has a responsibility to promote peace and security in the Arctic region.
Despite other components of their argument, the PRC's most glaring interest in the Arctic is economic. In 2013, China announced its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a major geopolitical initiative to knit Eurasia and other global regions together into a China-anchored or China-led economic infrastructure. The Arctic is a central component of accomplishing the BRI for the PRC.
ECHO Assessment: China views U.S. actions regarding the Panama Canal as a challenge to its Belt and Road Initiative and will likely continue investing in Arctic fossil fuel development and the Northern Sea Route. Additionally, the PRC will likely leverage U.S. tensions with Arctic allies to strengthen its presence in the region, funding key infrastructure projects and engaging in mining and scientific expeditions.
With Moscow's expressed desire for foreign investment in the Northern Sea Route, the PRC has a unique opportunity for a key partner in laying the infrastructure for their desired "Polar Silk Road." However, the choice of the PRC to invest in Russian Arctic development exposes China to risk in desired ventures in furtherance of the BRI. Before the invasion of Ukraine, Russian and Chinese Arctic cooperation held firm, as COSCO, a Chinese shipping company, previously was the largest non-Russian operator along the NSR. However, in 2022, this cooperation took a steep decline, with only 36 of the 314 vessels that sailed the NSR being non-Russian. ECHO speculates that this decline in cooperation was a direct measure to mitigate the loss of potential economic investment and engagement with A7 states.
Currently, the PRC commands a Ukrainian-built polar-capable icebreaker, the Xue Long (Snow Dragon), which has made several transits across the region for alleged research expeditions. A second polar capable icebreaker, the Xue Long 2 - the first Chinese-built icebreaker) entered service in 2019. The PRC entered the Jidi, a third icebreaker, into service in June 2024 and was deployed to the Arctic Region in August 2024. As of August 2024, the PRC has further expressed the intention to construct three additional icebreakers - which were then touted to be in the final stages of research and development.
The PRC has repeatedly attempted to increase its power in the Arctic through diplomatic and economic efforts. In 2018, China tried to fund the construction of several airports in Greenland. U.S. diplomatic efforts aggressively countered this effort, leading Denmark to ultimately finance the infrastructure projects. More recently, in 2024, Chinese investors close to PRC interests attempted to purchase land in Søre Fagerfjord, south of Longyearbyen on the Svalbard archipelago. While the Norwegian government prevented the purchase due to security concerns, the PRC remains persistent in attempts to acquire Arctic territory via official and non-official channels.
The PRC has historically succeeded in developing soft power in foreign nations and regions through academia. Since 2004, China has maintained a research station in Ny-Ålesund on Svalbard—the most northerly civilian settlement in the world. Further, in 2018, Iceland and China opened the joint China-Nordic Arctic Research Center (CNARC) in Karhóll. The PRC has since leveraged the CNARC to build a presence and trust with Iceland. However, open-source reporting indicates an erosion of trust by Iceland's officials, who cite the perception that the PRC intends to fuse civilian and military applications through the research.
U.S. Posturing and Diminishing Leverage
Contemporary U.S. Arctic posturing and leverage are rapidly shifting with the change of Executive guards. ECHO's concerns regarding a visible decline in leverage in the region stem little from the Arctic. Instead, they originate in the policies and statecraft recently deployed toward fossil fuels, allies, and a nationalist approach to foreign policy and trade in a time of unprecedented globalism. Each has a significant impact on military alliances, trade relations, the U.S. defense industry, and levers of global influence—further enabling adversarial gains in great power competition.
In January 2025, President Trump signed an executive order declaring a "national energy emergency," which lifted longstanding restrictions placed on fossil fuel drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and other previously protected lands in Alaska. Paired with the actions of setting up a U.S. withdrawal from the pulling out of the Paris Climate Agreement, the U.S. displays an aggressive desire for the nation to progress towards energy autonomy despite the risks of climate impact. It also directly contradicts the goals and policies of the other A7 leadership regarding environmental protections and broader allied agendas in transitioning reliance from fossil fuels to green energy resources.
Before President Trump and his administration signaled a desire to take Greenland, Arctic diplomatic ties between other A7 nations and the U.S. experienced turbulence, while the U.S. chaired the Arctic Council from 2015 to 2017—notably, during the first Trump administration, the U.S. dismantled several key Arctic-focused administrative structures like the Arctic Executive Steering Committee and withdrew from joint climate commitments. This early shift by the U.S. from multilateral Arctic engagement and environmental stewardship caused concerns from other key A7 nations on American long-term commitments to regional cooperation.
Additionally, recent tariffs levied by the U.S. against allies and adversaries alike have significantly undermined American influence globally and eroded American leverage in the Arctic region. While tariffs levied against Arctic allies may continue to isolate the U.S. from strategic joint ventures in securing the region and the willingness of allies to accept U.S. investment and cooperation in their ventures, the tariffs levied against China and their subsequent responses hold much broader impacts. On April 4, 2025, China responded to the initial array of tariffs from the Trump administration by placing sweeping export restrictions on seven rare earth elements (REE) - critical for advanced technologies with both civilian and military applications. For example, civilian manufacturing of EV batteries, smartphones, ceramics, computers, lasers, and fiber optics requires significant REEs.
Military applications for REEs during manufacturing include but are not limited to sonars, smart bombs, lasers, radars, satellites, and missile guidance systems—all of which would be critical in the military buildup for the U.S. and its allies in the Arctic region. Due to the PRC's near monopoly on the REE supply chain and the lagging domestic development of REE mining and refining capabilities, REE exports from China has significantly disrupted development timelines for strategic and tactical weaponry and systems for the U.S. military. With the absence of international trade frameworks and governance mechanisms designed to handle the transition of the Arctic from a strategic military and scientific research hub to a critical alternative global commerce shipping route, the decreased U.S. influence and capability of expanding military development has opened the door for PRC influence and control with Russia.
Strategic Outlook
As ECHO looks to the next decade, the stage is set for the Arctic region is poised to emerge as a key battleground in the great power competition between the United States, China, and Russia. We anticipate that geopolitical tensions will escalate, leading to significant military and economic developments globally and in the Arctic region. These developments will have profound impacts on the domestic and foreign policy strategies of Washington, Beijing, and Moscow and understanding the implications of this competition is vital for evaluating the future landscape of international relations.
ECHO advocates that intelligence practitioners, policymakers, and the general public to remain vigilant in identifying critical indicators that, if observed, would strengthen our confidence in the key findings of this assessment. These indicators include:
Alliance Attrition: Signs of weakening cooperation between the U.S. and its A7 states and NATO allies.
Adversarial Development of Dual-Use Infrastructure: The emergence of new infrastructure projects funded by China that could potentially be repurposed for military use.
Extended Resource Access Denial: Additional export bans or military actions by China or Russia aimed at restricting access to rare earth elements, fossil fuel development, or navigation routes in the Northern Sea Route.
Chokepoints in Arctic Commerce: Evidence of militarization or attempts by Russia or China to control emerging Arctic trade corridors.
By monitoring these indicators, we can better navigate the complex dynamics of the Arctic and its role in global power relations.
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