Elemental Warfare: Nation-State Competition for Rare Earth Minerals in Africa and Its Implication to US National Security

Written By Randall Stickley

CATs: TEXT

KIQs

KIQs:

  • Which state and non-state actors are actively using private military firms or mercenaries to secure or influence access to rare earth mineral resources, particularly in Africa?

  • How are China, Russia, and Western nations adapting their strategies to control rare earth supply chains, and what are the potential flashpoints for conflict arising from these efforts?

  • What are the vulnerabilities in African states' governance structures that foreign actors are exploiting to gain control over rare earth mining operations?

  • How is the competition for rare earth minerals contributing to regional instability and violence, and which areas are at highest risk for resource-driven conflict escalation?

  • What are the indicators of future militarization or coercive statecraft related to rare earth mineral extraction, and how might these actions affect global supply security and political alignment?

Disclaimer: This report is based on OSINT gathered from publicly available sources. The analysis, findings, and conclusions presented herein are intended for informational purposes only and do not reflect official government policies or classified intelligence assessments. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, OSINT is inherently susceptible to misinformation, bias, and manipulation. The use of this report should be accompanied by independent verification and critical analysis. The authors and distributors of this document are not responsible for any misinterpretation, unintended use, or consequences resulting from reliance on the information contained within.

Executive Summary

Global competition for rare earth minerals (REMs), essential to defense, energy, and technology, is driving geopolitical tension and instability, particularly in Africa. As China maintains dominance in the REM supply chain, the US, EU, and others are turning to African sources, where weak governance and fragile institutions create openings for exploitation. Russia, through private military firms/private military contractors (PMFs/PMCs)like the Wagner Group, is using security contracts to secure mining assets and expand influence, often fueling corruption and conflict. This militarized scramble for REMs risks deepening regional instability and violence as demand rises, especially with the global shift toward green technologies.

REMs and Their Strategic Significance to the US

REMs refer to naturally occurring mineral deposits that contain one or more critical materials essential to modern technology, defense systems, and energy infrastructure. These include, but are not limited to, cobalt, lithium, graphite, nickel, copper,tantalum, tungsten, and gold– minerals that are not rare chemically but are considered strategic due to their economic importance and the risk of supply disruptions. Moreover, a significant number of REMs mined globally maintain application to the production of microelectronics, telecommunications, and advanced weapons systems. Many of these minerals are found in geographically concentrated regions and are often extracted under unstable political conditions, particularly in parts of Africa, Asia, and South America.

The US maintains an increasing reliance on technologies that depend on these minerals; therefore, elevating them to the status of strategic resources. However, the US lacks sufficient domestic reserves and processing capacity for many of these materials, making it heavily dependent on foreign sources. Much of the global supply – particularly of cobalt, lithium, and tantalum – comes from regions with weak governance, such as the many nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, which accounts for over 30% of the world’s reserves.

In response, the US has prioritized the development of secure, diversified supply chains, particularly through partnerships with African nations, increased domestic investment, and policy frameworks promoting responsible sourcing. Ensuring access to these minerals is not merely an economic concern; it is a prerequisite for technological leadership, military readiness, and energy resilience.

In sum, REMs represent a strategic front in the global power competition. The control, development, and ethical governance of these resources will increasingly shape the balance of geopolitical influence in the 21st century.

Findings and Analysis

Nation-state competition for elemental resources, particularly REMs, is intensifying as global powers race to secure supply chains critical to defense, energy, and technology sectors. China currently dominates the REM market, controlling a majority of global refining capacity, which has prompted the US, EU, and other nations to pursue diversification strategies, often turning to Africa as a key source. This scramble for access has amplified geopolitical tensions, especially in resource-rich but politically unstable regions. In countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, and Madagascar, vast REM reserves are drawing increased foreign interest, often outpacing the capacity of local governments to regulate extraction or manage revenues. This creates openings for exploitation, corruption, and foreign manipulation.

  • China dominates the REM market, accounting for over 69% of global production and nearly 90% of processing capacity, underscoring its pivotal role in the supply chain for critical technologies.

  • In response to China's dominance, the US and EU are actively seeking to diversify their sources of REMs by investing in African mining projects, recognizing the continent's vast untapped strategic mineral wealth; including access to minerals such as 73% of the globe’s cobalt, 68% of nickel, 59% of lithium, and 40% of copper.

  • DRC is rich in critical minerals such as tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold has become a focal point of geopolitical interest, with foreign investments often exacerbating existing political and social tensions.  

  • Mozambique's Monte Muambe project and Madagascar's Ampasindava mine have attracted significant foreign investment, highlighting challenges in governance and regulatory oversight in managing these valuable resources.

  • The involvement of foreign entities, including private military contractors, in securing mineral assets in unstable regions like the DRC has raised concerns about exploitation and the undermining of local governance structures.

 A growing concern is the use of PMFs, PMCs, and mercenaries to secure strategic assets or destabilize competitors. Russia's Wagner Group, for example, has been active in securing mining concessions in countries such as Sudan and the Central African Republic under the guise of security assistance. These operations often provide Russia and similar actors with both financial gain and influence in weak states, while bypassing international norms. The presence of PMFs in these contexts undermines state sovereignty, weakens governance, and increases the likelihood of violence. It also raises the risk that strategic resources become bargaining chips in wider conflicts or tools for coercive diplomacy.

  • PMFs and mercenaries are increasingly employed by state and non-state actors to secure strategic assets or destabilize competitors. These entities operate in complex local military and terrorism conflicts, often unconstrained by human rights responsibilities, allowing governments to conduct operations without direct accountability.

  • Russia's Wagner Group has been active in securing mining concessions in countries such as Sudan and the Central African Republic under the guise of security assistance. In Sudan, Wagner was primarily aimed at guarding mineral resources, particularly gold mining resources, and acting as a support force for the Bashir government.

  • These operations often provide Russia and similar actors with both financial gain and influence in weak states, while bypassing international norms. In the Central African Republic, Wagner's operations have been described as a neo-imperialist and neo-colonial kind of state capture, whereby Russia gains sway over countries by helping to keep the ruling regime in power and making them reliant on its protection.

  • The presence of PMFs in these contexts undermines state sovereignty, weakens governance, and increases the likelihood of violence. The delegation of military functions to PMCs increases state dependency on the private sector for security, which can lead to competition with traditional armed forces for financial resources and personnel.

  • Implementation and use of PMFs and PMCs elevates therisk that strategic resources become bargaining chips in wider conflicts or tools for coercive diplomacy. The use of PMCs by states fundamentally alters a crucial tenet of sovereign power during war, affecting how combat deaths of privately-hired soldiers are remembered and how national sacrifice is perceived.

The militarization of resource extraction is accelerating the proliferation of localized conflict. Competition between local armed groups, foreign-backed militias, and state forces over access to REMs frequently ignites violence, displaces communities, and destabilizes already fragile states. Furthermore, the global demand for clean energy and digital technologies is projected to sharply increase the need for rare earths, likely exacerbating these dynamics. As global powers continue to pursue strategic resource security, the African continent remains a focal point of competition, where economic interests, weak institutions, and security vacuums intersect – creating a volatile mix that risks wider regional instability and persistent cycles of conflict.

  • The militarization of resource extraction is accelerating the proliferation of localized conflict. In regions around the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, armed groups vie for control over mineral-rich areas, leading to frequent clashes and instability.

  • Competition between local armed groups, foreign-backed militias, and state forces over access to REMs frequently ignites violence, displaces communities, and destabilizes already fragile states. For instance, the M23 rebel group's activities in eastern DRC have led to significant displacement and humanitarian crises.

  • The global demand for clean energy and digital technologies is projected to sharply increase the need for rare earths, likely exacerbating these dynamics. The International Energy Agency forecasts a substantial rise in demand for critical minerals essential for clean energy transitions.

  • As global powers continue to pursue strategic resource security, the African continent remains a focal point of competition, where economic interests, weak institutions, and security vacuums intersect. The Department of Defense (DoD) relies heavily on rare earth elements, with more than 78% of its weapons systems incorporating materials sourced from China, highlighting the geopolitical fragility stemming from REM competition and the US defense sector's vulnerability.

  • This volatile mix risks wider regional instability and persistent cycles of conflict. The ongoing conflicts and governance challenges in resource-rich African regions underscore the need for comprehensive strategies to address these issues.

Strategic Outlook

Intensification of global competition for REMs is reshaping geopolitical landscapes, with Africa emerging as the central theater of strategic maneuvering. China's dominance over REM production and refining has triggered a broad push by Western powers, particularly the US and EU, to diversify sources of supply, turning their focus to Africa's vast untapped mineral reserves. However, this strategic shift carries significant risks.

Short-Term Outlook – 1-5 Years YTD (May 2026-May 2030)

Africa will remain a battleground for influence, investment, and control over critical minerals. Nations like the DRC, Mozambique, and Madagascar will see increased foreign interest, but also heightened instability as weak regulatory frameworks and fragile political systems fail to keep pace. The entry of state-backed corporations and the covert use of PMFsand/or PMCs such as Russia’s Wagner Group are likely to continue, particularly in regions with poor governance and ongoing conflict. This not only undermines local sovereignty but fosters environments conducive to corruption, violent competition, and elite capture.

In the short term, localized conflicts around mining zones – fueled by competition between state forces, militias, and mercenaries – will likely proliferate. Strategic minerals may become instruments of coercion, used by global powers to pressure rivals or extract political concessions, particularly as demand for clean energy accelerates the race for REMs. Western efforts to establish alternative supply chains will struggle to match China's integrated control of the market unless coupled with coherent, long-term engagement strategies that build local capacity and stabilize host states.

Long-Term Outlook – 5-15 Years YTD (May 2030-May 2040)

Unless major reforms in resource governance, transparency, and security sector reform are implemented, the African mineral belt will face sustained instability. The persistence of PMFs and the privatization of security in mineral-rich regions risks normalizing a model of extractive militarization that could fracture states and regional alliances. Strategic mineral assets will increasingly influence global diplomatic alignments, with countries aligning economically and militarily based on resource dependencies.

The demand curve for REMs, driven by the global energy transition and tech expansion, will only steepen. As climate goals tighten and digital infrastructure expands, pressure on fragile states to produce rare earths will grow. Without intervention, this pressure will likely exacerbate governance failures, displace populations, and entrench conflict economies. Conversely, if international stakeholders commit to collaborative frameworks – prioritizing ethical sourcing, economic development, and security sector accountability – Africa could become a stabilizing force in the critical mineral supply chain rather than a flashpoint.

As part of this long-term outlook, there are four implications for strategic planning with regards to REMs:

  • Strategic mineral sourcing must be treated as both a supply chain and security issue;

  • Countering malign PMF influence will require integrated diplomatic, intelligence, and defense coordination;

  • Long-term investments in infrastructure, governance, and local beneficiation in Africa are essential to breaking cycles of instability; AND,

  • Multilateral institutions must play a greater role in regulating extraction practices, monitoring PMF activity, and supporting conflict mitigation in resource-rich areas.

Africa's mineral wealth is vital to the future of global technology and clean energy. However, without robust, coordinated engagement, the pursuit of these resources could ignite broader instability with global consequences.

Analyst Note: As of April 30, 2025, the US-Ukraine resource treaty establishes a jointly managed investment fund to develop Ukraine’s critical minerals sector, with profits reinvested domestically for the first decade. It ensures Ukraine retains full sovereignty over its natural resources while promoting transparent, equitable foreign investment. The treaty offers a practical template for African nations seeking to secure foreign partnerships without sacrificing autonomy. By adopting similar models, resource-rich African states could attract ethical investment, reduce dependence on private military firms, and ensure profits are reinvested locally to support governance and stability. This approach not only strengthens regional resilience but also positions African nations as reliable nodes in global critical mineral supply chains amid intensifying geopolitical competition.

Recommendations for US National Security Policy

  • Deepen bilateral and multilateral partnerships with African nations to co-develop rare earth mining, refining, and infrastructure projects. Agreements must prioritize transparency, anti-corruption mechanisms, and local benefit-sharing to prevent exploitation by malign actors and ensure long-term supply security.

  • Develop interagency task forces to monitor and counter foreign PMFs and PMCs (e.g., Wagner Group) operating near strategic mineral assets. This includes intelligence collection, threat mapping, and direct diplomatic engagement to discourage host-nation reliance on mercenary security providers.

  • Support African governments with technical assistance, regulatory development, and anti-corruption tools aimed at improving the governance of mineral extraction. Programs should include training for local officials, judicial support, and civil society engagement.

  • Expand US investment in domestic REM processing and recycling, while maintaining a strategic reserve of key minerals. Public-private partnerships should be incentivized to reduce reliance on unstable foreign sources.

  • Embed REM access and supply security into DoD strategic planning, wargaming, and procurement risk assessments. Treat mineral disruption scenarios as core elements of future conflict modeling.

Randall Stickley
Previous

Alternative futures assessment of Israel–Iran tensions, June through December 2025
Next

ECHO Threat Assessment: Great Power Competition in the Arctic Region 2025