Post-strike risk assessment – Regional escalation, national security implications of US-Iran tensions

Written By Randall Stickley

KIQs

  • To what extent are Iranian proxy forces – particularly Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) – planning or preparing for reprisals against US interests, both overseas and on the homeland?

  • Will Iran respond to the strikes by accelerating nuclear enrichment beyond the 60% threshold or formally withdrawing from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards?

  • What is the likelihood that Iran will attempt to close or disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and what capabilities are in place to respond quickly?

  • How are adversarial global powers – specifically Russia and China – leveraging the crisis to expand influence, disrupt Western cohesion, or support Iran diplomatically and militarily?

  • What indicators would signal an emerging threat to critical US infrastructure or symbolic domestic targets from Iranian-aligned actors or ideologically inspired individuals?

Disclaimer: This report is based on OSINT gathered from publicly available sources. The analysis, findings, and conclusions presented herein are intended for informational purposes only and do not reflect official government policies or classified intelligence assessments. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, OSINT is inherently susceptible to misinformation, bias, and manipulation. The use of this report should be accompanied by independent verification and critical analysis. The authors and distributors of this document are not responsible for any misinterpretation, unintended use, or consequences resulting from reliance on the information contained within.

 

Executive Summary

The recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities have sharply escalated tensions in the Middle East, expanding a shadow conflict into open confrontation with the potential for global spillover. Immediate concerns include asymmetric retaliation by Iranian-aligned proxy forces, breakdowns in nuclear transparency, economic instability tied to Strait of Hormuz security, and growing pressure on Gulf states and transatlantic alliances. Critically, the threat landscape now extends to the US homeland, where Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the PLF may respond with cyberattacks, lone-actor terrorism, and symbolic reprisals. While not all proxies possess the means for high-impact operations, the post-strike environment presents new opportunities for self-radicalized violence and digital disruption.

This assessment evaluates post-strike scenarios, explores potential reprisal mechanisms, projects regional and economic fallout, and provides updated risk modeling. It concludes with actionable recommendations to deter escalation, manage fallout, and defend US interests at home and abroad.

Post-Strike Assessment

Risk Matrix

To effectively evaluate the range of threats following US airstrikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, this assessment applies a risk matrix framework that categorizes potential developments along two dimensions: likelihood and strategic risk level. Each scenario was analyzed based on current intelligence indicators, historic precedent, adversary capability, and the geopolitical climate. Per ECHO’s previous assessment on alternative futures, likelihood reflects how probable a scenario is within the June to December 2025 window, based on observed intent, capacity, and early-stage movements. Likewise, risk level measures the potential severity of the scenario if it materializes, including impacts on national security, civilian safety, critical infrastructure, and international stability.

Figure 1: Risk matrix generate based on various factors and indicators identified as key stressors with probability to perpetuate the Israel-Iran conflict between June 2025 and December 2025

This approach allows decision-makers to distinguish between high-probability but manageable events and low-probability but catastrophic contingencies that demand strategic foresight. Overall, the matrix confirms that while a full-scale global conflict is improbable, the convergence of proxy retaliation, economic disruption, and homeland vulnerability makes this an unstable and high-risk period for US national security and regional order.

Projected Movements and Geopolitical Fallout

The US airstrikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure have introduced new risks across multiple domains. Regionally, Iranian proxies are expected to intensify operations: Hezbollah may escalate attacks on Israel’s northern border; Shi’a militias in Iraq may target US troops and facilities; the Houthis could strike Gulf shipping and energy nodes. Simultaneously, Iran is likely to accelerate uranium enrichment, reduce IAEA access, and harden its regional alliances – especially with Russia and China.

  • The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) poses a multi-domain threat through its global network of proxy militias, covert operations, cyber capabilities, and asymmetric warfare doctrine, enabling Iran to project influence, retaliate against adversaries, and destabilize regional actors while maintaining plausible deniability.

  • Iranian proxies are already showing signs of intensified operations – Hezbollah has increased rocket and drone activity on Israel’s northern border, Shi’a militias in Iraq are targeting US installations, and the Houthis have threatened Gulf maritime targets – reflecting a rapid and geographically dispersed response to the US strikes.

  • In parallel with regional proxy activity, Iran has signaled its intention to accelerate uranium enrichment beyond 60% and curb IAEA inspections. The country has also sought stronger political and military backing from Russia and China, framing the strikes as an opportunity to deepen strategic partnerships.

As of June 23, 2025, Iran launched a coordinated barrage of short-range ballistic missiles and armed drones targeting U.S. military installations in Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. The strikes reportedly resulted in limited structural damage and non-fatal injuries to several US personnel. CENTCOM has confirmed the incident and raised regional force protection levels to Condition Delta; indicative of imminent or recently transpired terrorist incident. IRGC claimed responsibility, framing the attack as direct retaliation for prior US involvement in the Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure.

The broader geopolitical landscape is now more fragmented. European allies may distance themselves from US strategy while quietly increasing pressure on Iran to prevent escalation. Gulf Arab states, though supportive of the strike’s strategic effect, fear backlash against their oil infrastructure and populations. Russia and China will seek to exploit the breakdown in multilateral diplomacy by deepening partnerships with Tehran and weakening US dominance in global institutions.

  • Leaders from the UK, France, and Germany have called for diplomatic restraint following US strikes, avoiding overt support but quietly urging Tehran to limit retaliatory measures.

  • Gulf states – especially Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait – expressed deep concern over regional spillover, elevating domestic security alerts due to the potential for attacks on oil facilities and local unrest.

 

Proxy Actors and Domestic Vulnerabilities

As tensions spike, US homeland security agencies must prepare for both causal reprisals, in direct response to the strikes, and opportunistic attacks, exploiting chaos for ideological or strategic gain.

Hezbollah presents the highest risk for action on US soil. It maintains logistics and facilitation networks in Latin America and the US, with the potential for coordinated attacks on synagogues, diplomatic sites, or critical infrastructure. Cyber operations targeting utilities and transportation systems are also plausible.

  • Hezbollah operates extensive logistics and facilitation networks in Latin America and potentially within the US, enabling the transfer of funds, weapons, and operatives for high-impact operations – including past attacks on Jewish and diplomatic sites, such as the 1992 Israeli embassy bombing and 1994 AMIA center attack in Argentina.

  • Hezbollah has developed cyber capabilities capable of targeting US critical infrastructure, such as utilities and transportation systems. Analysts warn its "Unit 1800" and affiliated cyber actors have conducted reconnaissance and could launch disruptive attacks in coordination with broader proxy strategies.

Hamas is less operationally capable internationally but may inspire lone-wolf attacks through online radicalization, particularly if Gaza is concurrently engaged by Israeli forces. Anti-Israel protests in the US could become flashpoints.

  • US intelligence and terrorism risk analysts have flagged Hamas-supporting content on social media and encrypted platforms as contributing to a surge in self-radicalized individuals. These lone actors pose a credible menace to soft targets – especially during heightened conflict involving Gaza – and often mobilize without direct orders from Hamas leadership.

  • Anti-Israel demonstrations in major US cities such as San Francisco, New York, and Washington, D.C. have drawn tens of thousands of pro-Palestinian supporters. Though largely peaceful, several events have escalated into clashes, and law enforcement has warned that these gatherings can serve as catalysts for targeted violence or extremist behavior.

Houthis lack traditional reach into the US but may leverage Iranian cyber capabilities to disrupt US port systems or maritime logistics indirectly tied to US companies.

  • Houthis, backed by Iran, have demonstrated evolving cyber-warfare capabilities that could target US maritime systems. Iran-affiliated Houthi cyber actors are known to conduct reconnaissance and disruptive operations against shipping infrastructure in the Red Sea, signaling the potential for similar tactics against US port and logistics networks using Iranian cyber expertise.

  • Houthis threaten US commercial interests through maritime disruptions despite a lacking domestic presence. Since late 2023, Houthi forces have increased their use of drones and missiles against international shipping – including vessels tied to US companies – forcing rerouting and raising global risk; this pattern could be scaled to target US logistical supply chains if cyber-linked proxy capabilities are activated.

PLF, though largely dormant, could resurface in symbolic acts or incitement campaigns. Online messaging and reactivated diaspora networks could inspire or provoke violence against US Jewish or government-affiliated targets.

  • As of October 1997, the US Department of State formally designated PLF as a foreign terrorist organization. The group is known historically for high-profile attacks like the 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking. Although largely inactive today, its ideological roots remain a concern, as diaspora networks could revive support structures to fuel protests or symbolic acts targeting US Jewish or government institutions.

  • The broader Palestinian militant ecosystem – including entities like the PLF – has been linked to fundraising networks and incitement channels in the US, contributing to protest movements and occasional violent incidents such as the May 2025 D.C. Jewish Museum shooting. These dynamics suggest that PLF messaging might catalyze or legitimize unrest at US demonstrations or symbolic sites.

These threats, while not immediate in scale, are amplified by the highly visible nature of the US role and the emotional resonance of this escalation across ideological lines. Federal, state, and local security entities must remain vigilant against both directed attacks and lone-actor radicalization catalyzed by proxy narratives.

 

Closure of the Strait of Hormuz

Iran’s ability to disrupt or close the Strait of Hormuz presents a significant global economic threat. The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime chokepoint located between Iran to the north and Oman and the UAE to the south. It connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and ultimately to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. This waterway supports 20% of the world’s oil and over 25% of liquified natural gas (LNG) shipments. In retaliation for US aggression, Iran may mine shipping lanes, harass tankers, or target Gulf infrastructure with missiles or drones.

  • On average, 20 million barrels per day – equivalent to roughly 20% of global oil consumption – transited the Strait of Hormuz in the first quarter of 2025, making it the most important maritime chokepoint for energy flows.

  • Approximately 20–30% of the world's LNG exports, notably from Qatar and the UAE, pass through the Strait. As of reporting, there are no practical alternative export routes in case of disruption.

  • Following US–Israel strikes, Iran’s parliament formally called for the Strait’s closure, citing national defense. Even temporary disruptions could cause oil prices to surge to $130+ per barrel and cut 0.8% off global GDP.

Shipping insurance would skyrocket, and Asian importers – Japan, India, South Korea – would face cascading supply disruptions. Gulf Arab states would suffer revenue losses and increased domestic insecurity, while the US Navy would be pressured to lead an international coalition to re-secure maritime traffic.

  • Shipping insurance premiums through the Strait of Hormuz could increase five- to tenfold in a conflict scenario, as seen during prior escalations in 2019–2020, driving up global transport costs and delaying deliveries to major energy importers like Japan, India, and South Korea.

  • Gulf Arab states would face sharp revenue drops from restricted oil exports, prompting potential subsidy cuts and domestic unrest, while the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet would likely lead multinational operations to restore maritime security.

Such an action would not only trigger military escalation but also push global inflation and trigger recessionary pressures in vulnerable markets, particularly in Europe and parts of Asia. Cyberattacks targeting port infrastructure could amplify the impact.

 

Proposed Ceasefire

As of June 23, 2025, President Donald Trump announced that US-brokered talks, including Qatari mediation, had yielded a phased ceasefire between Israel and Iran – beginning with a 24-hour “complete and total” halt to hostilities. Trump characterized the outcome as a major diplomatic success. However, conflicting reports emerged within hours: while Qatari officials and select US media outlets confirmed the outlines of a truce, Iran denied any binding agreement, demanding that Israeli operations halt first. This ambiguity underscores the fragile nature of the ceasefire narrative – one shaped as much by public signaling as actual de-escalation on the ground. Meanwhile, fighting has continued, undermining confidence in any lasting pause.

  • President Trump credited Qatar’s prime minister for mediating the ceasefire and claimed both sides had agreed to a phased stand-down, starting with Iran.

  • Iranian officials reject ceasefire claims: Iran’s foreign minister publicly denied that a formal agreement had been reached, asserting that Tehran would not pause military responses unless Israeli strikes ended first.

  • According to multiple sources, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) conducted targeted strikes near Tehran shortly after Trump’s announcement, reportedly hitting a drone production facility. This action casts further doubt on the ceasefire’s enforcement and suggests ongoing Israeli strategic objectives despite diplomatic overtures.

 

Strategic Conflict Outlook

Limited Global War Risk, Elevated Regional and Homeland Threats

Despite the high-stakes nature of recent US airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and the subsequent rise in tension, current global geopolitical conditions do not support the onset of a true global war scenario. The absence of binding military alliances akin to Cold War blocs, the restrained posture of NATO, and the calculated ambiguity from other great powers like China and Russia suggest that a full-scale World War III scenario remains unlikely. Both Moscow and Beijing have shown strategic interest in leveraging this crisis for diplomatic and economic influence rather than direct confrontation, and US allies in Europe remain cautious, fractured, and largely uninterested in deeper entanglement.

However, this relative global detachment does not translate to regional stability. On the contrary, the vacuum of coordinated global intervention may embolden Iranian proxies and heighten the risk of escalating regional violence. Iran’s proxy ecosystem – Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthi forces, and PLF factions – is likely to interpret the geopolitical silence not as deterrence, but as opportunity. This could lead to a surge in coordinated attacks across Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and potentially extending into the broader Gulf region.

Of greatest concern is the mounting risk of militant reprisals against US targets on domestic soil. Intelligence indicators suggest that Tehran or its aligned groups could attempt to replicate the symbolic and strategic disruption inflicted on Iranian facilities by targeting comparable American assets. This includes:

  • Military installations, particularly those associated with Middle East deployments or nuclear infrastructure;

  • Major metropolitan centers with socio-political visibility, such as New York City, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and Chicago; AND,

  • Critical infrastructure hubs, including transportation terminals, energy grids, financial centers, and water systems.

While there is no current indication of imminent, organized attacks by Iranian proxies on the US homeland, the evolving conflict climate and the psychological imperative to "equalize the battlefield" increases the plausibility of targeted, high-impact incidents. These could take the form of cyber-sabotage, lone-actor terrorism inspired by proxy narratives, or even low-tech physical assaults designed for maximum media resonance.

In short, while the lack of broad geopolitical fervor reduces the likelihood of a world war scenario, regional destabilization and asymmetric warfare – including threats to the US homeland – are sharply rising. These risks demand a recalibration of threat posture that centers not on global military entanglement, but on agile, intelligence-driven responses to non-state actors and distributed security vulnerabilities.

 

Economic Consequences of a Hormuz Closure

The prospect of Iran disrupting or closing the Strait of Hormuz is not just an energy crisis scenario – it’s a strategic lever with the potential to reshape global risk tolerance and accelerate geopolitical realignments. If conflict escalates to the point where maritime traffic through Hormuz is threatened or halted, the consequences will cascade far beyond the Gulf.

First, Iran would be signaling that it is willing to escalate beyond proxy warfare and accept the global costs of economic warfare. This suggests a shift in Tehran’s calculus – from calibrated deterrence to economic coercion, knowing full well that the US and its allies rely on economic stability to maintain domestic and international legitimacy.

Second, the closure of the Strait would immediately force energy-importing powers like China, India, and Japan into a difficult balancing act. They would have to weigh their economic exposure against their strategic alignment. If Iran causes a sustained spike in global oil prices, expect renewed efforts by these states to pressure the US to de-escalate – even as they hedge closer to Iran or Russia to ensure supply continuity.

Third, the US itself would face a dilemma: respond militarily to reopen Hormuz and risk further regional entanglement or absorb the economic shock and seek non-kinetic containment. Either option would carry significant domestic political costs, especially in an election cycle. The attack would also raise serious questions about the effectiveness of current US deterrence posture – particularly in protecting the global commons.

Most importantly, a successful or prolonged closure would expose a core fragility in global economic architecture: the overconcentration of energy flows through a single geographic chokepoint with limited redundancy. Iran knows this. The threat alone may be enough to spike markets, unsettle alliances, and widen the political space for Iran and its partners – namely Russia and China – to push for a multipolar economic security order.

A disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is not just an energy event. It is an economic weapon of influence, capable of altering the tempo and terms of regional war and shifting the burden of escalation onto global markets and decision-makers. The US and its partners must weigh not only how to defend shipping lanes, but how to insulate the global economy from a crisis that Iran has now shown it can credibly trigger.

 

Potential for Ceasefire

Likelihood of an immediate and enforceable ceasefire between Israel and Iran appears low, given the volume of conflicting reports and the continued kinetic activity on both sides. While President Trump and Qatari mediators have publicly claimed a ceasefire was reached, Iran has categorically denied the existence of any formal agreement, framing such declarations as premature or politically motivated. Compounding this diplomatic breakdown, the IDF reportedly carried out airstrikes near Tehran just hours after the announcement, signaling that Israel’s strategic campaign – particularly against Iran’s drone infrastructure – remains active despite public calls for de-escalation. This disconnect between high-level diplomatic messaging and on-the-ground military action suggests a widening credibility gap that undermines ceasefire enforcement. The situation is further complicated by Iran’s conditional stance, which demands a full Israeli halt to offensive operations before any Iranian de-escalation. Without synchronized restraint or third-party monitoring, any pause in hostilities is likely to be informal, unstable, and easily reversed by even a single provocation or misfire.

Randall Stickley
Next

Alternative futures assessment of Israel–Iran tensions, June through December 2025